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What became known as the Cuban missile crisis began publicly in the evening of 22 October 
1962 with President John F. Kennedy’s dramatic broadcast announcing ‘a strict quarantine on all 
offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba’ to bring about the removal from the island 
of newly-discovered Soviet medium- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The U.S. Navy 
would stop and search vessels traveling towards Cuba over an area radiating 500 nautical miles 
from the island.1 Although Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had agreed by 28 October to 
remove the missiles, wrangling over Soviet bombers in Cuba meant that the ‘quarantine’ or naval 
blockade remained in place until 20 November.2 Historians have praised the decision to establish 
a blockade for striking a balance between belligerence and passivity, and for preserving other 
policy options such as military action or diplomacy.3 One of the disadvantages of the blockade, 
though, from the perspective of the American government, was that it might precipitate legal 
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1 Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Build-up in Cuba, 22 October 1962, Public Papers 
of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 (United States Government Printing Office: 
Washington, 1963), pp. 806-809. ‘Offensive’ weapons were defined as ‘Surface-to-surface missiles; 
bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above 
weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items; and any other classes 
of materiel hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense’. See Kennedy’s proclamation ‘Interdiction 
of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba’, 23 October 1962, Public Papers 1962, pp. 809-811. For 
details about the interception area, see Adlai Stevenson to the UN Security Council, 27 October 1962, 
reproduced in R.P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy, third edition (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2006), p.282. 
The missile crisis has inspired a vast literature. Recent overviews include Jonathan Colman, The Cuban 
Missile Crisis: Origins, Course and Aftermath (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016); Michael 
M. Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New 
York: Knopf, 2008); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’: Khrushchev, 
Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–64 (New York: Norton, 1997); Alice L. George, The Cuban Missile Crisis: 
The Threshold of Nuclear War (New York and London: Routledge, 2013); and Don Munton and David 
A. Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History, 2nd edn (Oxford UK and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
2 On the aftermath of the crisis, see David Coleman, The Fourteenth Day: JFK and the Aftermath of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Norton, 2012), and Sergo Mikoyan, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: 
Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Missiles of November, ed. Svetlana Savranskaya 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
3 Mark J. White, ‘The Cuban Imbroglio: from the Bay of Pigs to the Missile Crisis and Beyond’, in Mark 
J. White, ed., Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited (New York: New York University Press, 1998), p.75. 
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controversy, which would in turn undermine sympathy for U.S. policy. Washington strove, 
therefore, in the words of State Department legal adviser Abram Chayes, to win ‘world support’ 
and ‘the ultimate judgment of history’ by developing and promoting a legal case for the blockade 
alongside presenting political and security arguments.4 
It was asserted, in an effort to establish law by precedent as well as to garner political 
backing, that the ‘quarantine’ fell short of a traditional belligerent blockade and so avoided the 
implications of a state of war. This proved hard to accept for some observers, though, as did the 
reliance on the Organization of the American States (OAS) instead of the United Nations (UN) 
to authorise the blockade. Allies backed American policy out of political self-interest rather than 
out of legal considerations, although evidence from British files demonstrates that the legal 
position still mattered because of the need to preserve domestic backing for supporting the 
United States. While the Soviet agreement to withdraw the missiles from Cuba was undoubtedly 
a triumph for Washington, a NATO diplomat noted after the resolution of the crisis that ‘the 
legal basis’ of the blockade had been ‘greatly criticized’.5 This indicates that the legal campaign 
met with limited success; in fact, even some American officials doubted the lawfulness of the 
blockade. Although within the next year or two most American jurists who expressed a view 
agreed that their government had acted within the law, over the longer term the legal status of the 
blockade of Cuba has generated mixed feelings. 
 International law specialists have explored the blockade’s legal propriety, and how far 
legal considerations influenced American and Soviet behaviour during the missile crisis.6 
                                                 
4 Abram Chayes, ‘The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba’, Department of State Bulletin, 19 November 
1963, p.763. On the State Department’s Legal Office (of which Chayes was head), see Richard B. Bilder, 
‘The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs’, The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 56, No. 3 (July 1962), pp. 633-84. See also Stanley D. Metzger, 
‘United States of America’, in H.C.L Merillat (ed), Legal Advisers and Foreign Affairs (Oceana: Dobbs 
Ferry, 1964), pp.153-59. 
5 M. Couve de Murville to French diplomatic posts, 10 November 1962, Cold War International History 
Project Bulletin, 17/18 (Fall 2012), p.757.  
6 Most U.S. jurists who published an opinion after the missile crisis considered that the blockade was 
compatible with international law. See, for example, Carl Q. Christol and Charles R. Davis, ‘Maritime 
Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated Matériel to Cuba, 1962’, The 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 57, No. 3 (July 1963), pp.525-545; W. T. Mallison, Jr, 
‘Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine Interdiction: National and Collective Self-Defense Claims Valid 
Under International Law’, George Washington Law Review, Vol. 31 (1962-1963), pp.335-98;  Myres S. 
McDougal, ‘The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense’, Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship 
Papers, Paper 2607 (1963), pp.597-604; and Eustace Seligman, ‘The Legality of U.S. Quarantine Action 
under the United Nations Charter’, American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2 (February 1963), 
pp.142-45. Larman C. Wilson, ‘International Law and the United States Cuban Quarantine of 1962’, 
Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (October 1965), pp.485-492, examines the almost-
complete consensus among American lawyers in favour of the legality of the quarantine, and provides a 
comprehensive bibliography (pp.491-92). The few critics included Quincy Wright, ‘The Cuban 
Quarantine’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 57 (1963), pp.546-65, who maintained that 
while the American government fell short of its ‘legal obligations to respect the freedom of the seas, to 
submit threats to the peace to the United Nations before taking unilateral action, and to refrain from use or 
threat of force in international relations except in individual or collective self-defense against armed 
attack, under authority of the United Nations’ (p.563). For another critical stance, see Stephen R. Shalom, 
‘International Lawyers and Other Apologists: The Case of the Cuban Missile Crisis’, Polity, Vol. 12, No. 
1 (Autumn 1979), pp.83-109. For the influence of international law on the American and Soviet 
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However, historians have tended to overlook the legal side of the confrontation, perhaps out of a 
reluctance to engage with the perceived complexities of international law, and because of the 
influential realist conception that international law counts for little when vital national interests 
are at stake.7 This article explores the American government’s making and presentation of the 
legal case for the blockade, and addresses how the British, Canadian and Australian governments 
responded.8 The research draws on declassified documents – some rarely used before – from 
American and British archives, alongside the analyses of jurists and historians. The work 
provides a fresh angle on the legality of the blockade and on how the U.S. administration tried to 
‘sell’ its policy during the most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War. 
 
Legal Thinking About Naval Blockades 
 
The law of naval blockades was an aspect of customary international law, which reflects legal 
customs or habits, and imposes obligations on governments. First used in the 16th century, the 
blockade was a form of siege warfare that involved isolating enemy ports or coastline from the 
high seas to prevent sea-borne commerce with other countries. A blockade was seen as a 
definitive act of war, but in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, ‘pacific’ (non-belligerent) 
blockades emerged as a supposedly legal means of coercion short of war. These were considered 
to be ‘pacific’ because they were confined only to the vessels of the blockaded country, and 
because they were associated with relatively minor disputes such as the non-payment of debts. 
However, the doctrine of pacific blockade was controversial. Jurist Lassa Oppenheim noted in 
1952 that while there was ambiguity about the admissibility of blockades confined only to the 
vessels of the blockaded state, there was a consensus that the peacetime seizure and sequestration 
of the vessels of third party states was illegal.9 International law embodies law-making treaties as 
well as customary law. These treaties include the UN Charter (1945), the Geneva Conventions 
(1949), Law of the Sea (1948), the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities 
(1961), and many others. Article 2 of the UN Charter states that ‘all Members shall settle their 
international disputes by peaceful means’, and should ‘refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force’. Furthermore, Article 42 appears to prohibit the unilateral 
institution of a blockade by providing for Security Council authorisation of operations ‘by air, 
                                                                                                                                                             
governments during the missile crisis, see Radhika Withana, Power, Politics, Law: International Law and 
State Behaviour During International Crises (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp.167-97. 
7 For realist perspectives on the missile crisis, see Withana, Power, Politics, Law, pp.184-86. 
8 The legal case was outlined in public statements, memoranda, the Department of State Bulletin, 
briefings to foreign officials, and – later – in publications from government lawyers. See especially 
Telegram to all diplomatic and consular posts, 24 October 1962, FRUS 1961-1963 X/XI/XII American 
Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (1998), document 390 
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10-12mSupp/d390> and Chayes, ‘The Legal 
Case for U.S. Action’. See also Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis: International Crises and the 
Role of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).  
9 See Lassa Oppenheim, edited by Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law Vol II Disputes, War and 
Neutrality, 7th edition (London: Longman, 1952), pp.144-49, for changing legal perceptions of the 
blockade. See also Robert E. Morabito, ‘Maritime Interdiction: The Evolution of a Strategy’, Naval War 
College Paper, 11 February 1991, pp.3-11.  
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sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations’.10 Jurist Ian Brownlie suggested in 1963 
that the UN Charter helped to normalise ‘the illegality of force as a means of self-help’, other 
than in self-defense.11 
The U.S. government had since 1960 tried to depose the regime of Fidel Castro in 
Havana through a variety of measures, including the supposedly-covert orchestration of what 
turned out to be a disastrous attack on Cuba by émigrés at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. 
Delegates in the UN and jurists criticised the action as violating the general principles of 
international law requiring a state to prevent military expeditions against other states from its 
territory in peacetime, and of contravening various inter-American conventions opposing 
interventions.12 In the late summer of 1962 – against the background of Castro’s consolidation of 
power and a Soviet military build-up in Cuba – there were voices in Congress advocating a naval 
blockade (of unspecified scope) of the island. However, Abram Chayes, Head of the State 
Department’s Legal Office, questioned the lawfulness of this option. In his assessment, a 
belligerent blockade, involving the legal right to interfere with third-party commerce, was 
problematic ‘because we are not in a state of war with Cuba’. At the same time, a pacific 
blockade would have to be ‘proportionate to a specific international wrong’ committed by the 
Havana regime, and would need to be ‘reconciled with obligations undertaken in the Inter-
American system and under the UN Charter’.13 
In respect of the inter-American obligations, Chayes argued that with a two-thirds vote 
the OAS could be used to back the blockade of Cuba, and that in these circumstances a blockade 
could be regarded as a UN ‘enforcement action’ under UN Charter Article 53, which enabled the 
Security Council to ‘utilize … regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under 
its authority’. He noted that this, however, would be impossible given the Soviet right of veto in 
the Security Council. Chayes also suggested that it might be possible to avoid the designation of 
belligerent blockade by stretching the definition of a pacific one ‘to cover shipping of nations 
aligned with the blockaded one’, but, even so, the ‘legal and political problems’ would be 
formidable.14 These were disinterested reflections prior to the discovery of the Soviet nuclear 
missiles. As will be seen, Chayes later put his reservations aside to become a vigorous advocate 
                                                 
10 Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law (New York: 
Macmillan, 1992), p.658; Josef Kunz, ‘Sanctions in International Law’, American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 54 (1960), pp.324, 331 (324-348). 
11 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force By States (Oxford UK: Clarendon, 1963), 
pp.120-21. 
12 Wright, ‘The Cuban Quarantine’, p.546. Literature on U.S. efforts to bring down Castro includes Don 
Bohning, The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations against Cuba, 1959–1965 (Washington, DC: 
Potomac Books, 2005); Fabian Escalante, The Cuba Project: CIA Covert Operations, 1959-62 
(Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2004); Howard Jones, The Bay of Pigs (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008); and Jim Rasenberger, The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America’s Doomed Invasion of 
Cuba’s Bay of Pigs (New York: Scribner, 2011). On the role of the UN, see Daniele Ganser, Reckless 
Gamble: The Sabotage of the United Nations in the Cuban Conflict and the Missile Crisis of 1962 (New 
Orleans: University Press of the South, 2000). 
13 Brubeck to Bundy, 11 September 1962, enclosing Abram Chayes’ ‘International Law Problems of 
Blockade’, 611.3722/9-1162, RG 59, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park 
(NARA II), Maryland.  
14 Brubeck to Bundy, 11 September 1962, enclosing Abram Chayes’ ‘International Law Problems of 
Blockade’, 611.3722/9-1162, RG 59, NARA II.  
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of the legality of the ‘quarantine’ – although the case would now rest in part on the presence of 
the weapons.  
Around this time, there was a further analysis, for Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, 
based on (as yet unfounded) speculation in Congress that the Soviets had turned Cuba into a 
nuclear missile base.15 Norbert Schlei of the Department of Justice concluded that ‘international 
law would permit use by the United States of relatively extreme measures, including various 
forms and degrees of force, for the purpose of terminating such a threat to the peace and security 
of the Western Hemisphere’.16 Therefore the justification in Schlei’s argument was one of self-
defense. As will be seen, the American government did not invoke self-defense in the legal case, 
but this justification for the blockade did feature heavily in the narrative of American policy. 
Likewise, Chayes’ idea of using the OAS as a UN substitute would be a pillar of the legal case – 
minus his reservations. The analyses from Chayes and Schlei meant that officials had already 
explored the lawfulness of the blockade by the time the Soviet missiles were discovered, which 
meant that there was an off-the-peg legal case available – subject to minor alteration to ensure 
the best fit.  
 
The Legal Case for the ‘Quarantine’ of Cuba 
 
First meeting on 16 October, ExComm (the Executive Committee of the National Security 
Council) explored whether to attack the missile bases, or to blockade Cuba as a means of 
inhibiting the development of the bases and pressuring the Soviet Union into withdrawing the 
missiles.17 As ExComm moved towards implementing a blockade, officials considered whether 
there should be a declaration of war against Cuba to legalise the stop and search of third-party 
vessels. Former ambassador to Moscow Llewellyn Thompson argued that declaring war would 
be useful because the Soviets would be more likely to respect a blockade that had been ‘legally 
established’. Undersecretary of State George Ball believed that a declaration of war would help 
allies to know where they stood, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk recognised that such a 
declaration would carry ‘many legal privileges as a belligerent that would be extremely useful 
for us’. By contrast, Assistant Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach and former Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson believed that self-defense provided a sufficient justification for any military 
action.  Robert F. Kennedy believed that OAS support was decisive, and so rendered a 
declaration of war superfluous. President Kennedy also opposed declaring war. Although he was 
keen to convey a stance of firm resolution, and was reluctant to make public concessions, he 
recognised the potential for a trade involving American ‘Jupiter’ missiles stationed in Turkey, 
                                                 
15 Some Republican senators asserted (speculatively) that the Soviet Union had stationed strategic nuclear 
missiles in Cuba. See e.g. Max Holland, ‘A Luce Connection: Senator Keating, William Pawley, and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 1999), pp.139–67; and Roger 
Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of  John F. Kennedy 
(New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp.177-80. 
16 Norbert Schlei, ‘Legality under International Law of Remedial Action Against Use of Cuba as a Missile 
Base by the Soviet Union’, n.d., reproduced in Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis, pp.108-132. 
17 On ExComm, see Elizabeth Cohn, ‘President Kennedy’s Decision to Impose a Blockade in the Cuban 
Missile Crisis: Building Consensus in the ExComm After the Decision’, in James A. Nathan, ed., The 
Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992), pp.219-35; David R. Gibson, Talk 
at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2012); and Sheldon M. Stern, The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile 
Crisis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
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and he felt that declaring war would reduce his options by generating pressure to attack the 
Soviet missile bases.18 Thus, the American government refrained from declaring war against 
Cuba. 
U.S officials chose the term ‘quarantine’ instead of ‘blockade’ or Norbert Schlei’s 
suggestion of ‘visit and search’. The inspiration for the choice of word has been attributed to 
Leonard Meeker (by himself and by Chayes), to Dean Acheson (by Paul Nitze), and others, 
including Richard Nixon, who had used the term earlier. Whoever was responsible, Meeker 
explained that the rationale was ‘to avoid any implication of a state of war from the imposition of 
measures which we described as blockade’. The term was an attempt to convey restraint in a 
volatile situation as well as to obviate legal difficulties. It also had the benefit of echoing a 1937 
speech from President Franklin D. Roosevelt in which he urged ‘peace-loving nations’ to 
‘quarantine’ the European ‘aggressors’, and avoided unfavourable associations with the Soviet 
blockade of Berlin in 1948-49.19 The Department of State maintained that the ‘quarantine’ was ‘a 
selective effort designed to deal with a threat to peace’ by ‘preventing the introduction of 
offensive weapons into Cuba in order to protect ourselves and this hemisphere from war’. By 
contrast, a blockade was ‘an operational part of the conduct of war, designed to force a state to 
comply with the wishes of the blockading country by crushing the economy of the state’.20 
Therefore, according to the American government, the ‘quarantine’ was an instrument of peace, 
not war.  
Withana has argued fairly that the U.S. government’s legal advocacy was an attempt to 
change international law, although historian Jutta Weldes sees the reference to a ‘quarantine’ 
rather than ‘blockade’ as an attempt to camouflage ‘an act of aggression against a sovereign 
state’. Similarly, historian Robert Weisbrot sees the word ‘quarantine’ as ‘a velvet wrap to 
                                                 
18 Record of Meeting, 19 October 1962, FRUS 1961-1963 XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath 
(Washington DC: USGPO, 1996), document 218; Record of Meeting, 19 October 1962, XI, document 31; 
and Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow, eds., John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, Volume II: September 
- October 21, 1962 (New York: Norton, 2001), pp.524, 532, 542, 610; and Philip Zelikow and Ernest 
May, eds, John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, Volume III October 22–28 1962 (New York: Norton, 
2001), p.41. Although obsolescent, the Jupiter missiles were a sensitive issue in relations with Turkey and 
other NATO states. See Barton J. Bernstein, ‘Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems 
of the American Jupiters in Turkey’ in Nathan, ed., Cuban Missile Crisis, pp.55-129; and Don Munton, 
‘The Fourth Question: Why did John F. Kennedy offer up the Jupiters in Turkey?’, in David Gioe, Len 
Scott and Christopher Andrew, eds., An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis: A 50-Year 
Retrospective (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 258-78. See also Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of 
October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957–1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1997). 
19 Chayes, Cuban Missile Crisis, p.10; , Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST) 
interview with Leonard Meeker conducted by Robert J. Martens, 25 April 1989; NSC meeting, 21 
October 1962, FRUS 1961-1963 XI, document 38; Norbert A. Schlei oral history interview conducted by 
John Stewart, 20-21 February 1968, JFKLM; Richard J. Walton, Cold War and Counter-revolution: The 
Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy (Baltimore: Penguin, 1972), p.124; and Robert Weisbrot, Maximum 
Danger: Kennedy, the Missiles and the Crisis of American Confidence (Chicago: Dee, 2001),  pp.131, 
132. 
20 Questions and Answers, and Statements of the Legal Basis for the Quarantine, 23 October 1962, 
611.3722/10-2362, RG 59, NARA II.    
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cushion global reaction to a U.S. show of seapower’.21 There were also those within the 
American government who were critical, with Richard N. Gardner of the U.S. Mission to the UN 
suggesting privately that ‘a blockade cannot be justified by its selectivity or by using some other 
name’.22 However, the focus on terminology from Meeker et al, and the accompanying 
elaboration of the legal position, was both an effort to develop international law, and to 
shape moral perceptions of U.S. policy; each objective involved trying to bring about a 
positive view of the blockade. In the legal context, this was not straightforward. The 
position that only military cargo rather than the necessities of life was designated contraband, 
and that vessels carrying military cargo would be diverted rather than seized or destroyed,23 
represented the more pacific aspects of the blockade. At the same time, blockading third-party 
vessels presented a belligerent aspect that sat ill with existing international law. There also was 
the awkward question of the lack of UN backing. 
Of course, the Soviet Union and Cuba were always going to criticise the U.S. legal 
position. A Soviet legal specialist had argued in Pravda in September that blockading Cuba 
would represent the ‘same sort of international crime as an armed invasion’, and during the 
missile crisis Nikita Khrushchev complained that the blockade violated ‘international norms of 
freedom of navigation on the high seas’, and that OAS authorisation had no legal standing.24 
Fidel Castro contended that the blockade contravened ‘international law and Cuban sovereignty’ 
and also attacked ‘the rights of all countries because it was proposed to violate ships of all 
nationalities on the high seas’.25 Both Khrushchev and Castro were selective in their respect for 
international law (given Soviet actions in Budapest in 1956, and Cuban subversion in Latin 
America, for example). A recent analysis has noted that while Soviet officials did not take the 
initiative in respect of making a case in law,26 there were still worries in the U.S. administration 
that Soviet and Cuban legal arguments could gain momentum. Although it emerged on 
Wednesday 24 October that Soviet ships carrying military cargo en route to Cuba were 
retreating,27 the fact that the blockade was to last indefinitely until all ‘offensive’ weapons had 
been removed led Chayes’ assistant, Leonard Meeker, to spend time at the UN in New York to 
‘turn aside and defeat’ Soviet arguments by outlining the ‘legal grounds ... for taking measures of 
force to remove the missile bases’.28 
It is worth discussing why the U.S. government not taken its case to the UN as soon as 
the missiles were discovered, instead of going ahead independently with a naval blockade. First, 
it was recognised that there would be awkward questions about the comparability of American 
                                                 
21 Withana, Power, Politics, Law, p.194; Weisbrot, Maximum Danger, p.132; and Jutta Weldes, 
Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p.83. 
22 Gardner to Cleveland, ‘Fundamentals of United States Position in Cuba’, 27 October 1962, U.S. 
Mission to the UN, RG 84, NARA II; and Morabito, ‘Maritime Interdiction’, p.1. 
23 Zelikow and May, eds, John F. Kennedy III, p.73.  
24 Translation of G. Tunkin, ‘Cuba’s Enemies Violate International Law’, Pravda, 19 September 1962,  
Office of Assistant Legal Adviser for Interamerican Affairs, RG 59, NARA II; Khrushchev to Kennedy, 
23 October 1962, FRUS 1961-1963 XI,  document 48; and Khrushchev to Kennedy, 24 October 1962, 
FRUS 1961-1963 XI,  document 61. 
25 Havana to FO, 24 October 1962, FO 371/162377, The National Archives (TNA), Kew, Surrey. 
26 Withana, Power, Politics, Law, p.197. 
27 See Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, pp. 87-9, 91, for an iconoclastic account of the ‘eyeball-to-
eyeball’ confrontation between Soviet and American vessels.  
28 Interview with Leonard Meeker conducted by Robert J. Martens, ADST, 25 April 1989.  
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nuclear missile bases abroad – especially in Turkey – and the Soviet bases in Cuba (see page ?? 
of this article). Two, there was not likely to be great alarm within the UN at news of the bases, 
and even if it was accepted that the missiles represented an act of aggression, the organisation 
would not have been able to authorise the use of force because of the Soviet veto in the Security 
Council. Three, pursuing the issue in the UN would be time-consuming. Finally, as the President 
had warned the Soviet Union in September about the danger of stationing ‘offensive’ weapons in 
Cuba it would be difficult to compromise on the issue.29 
In respect of the politics of the Security Council, Meeker had anticipated that members 
Romania, the United Arab Republic, and Ghana would oppose the blockade. The seven votes 
required to authorise the measure would be available only if the other states – Britain, France, the 
Republic of China, Chile, Venezuela, and Ireland – voted affirmatively. However, there were 
doubts about the Irish position, and even if there were enough votes available to endorse 
American policy, the Soviet Union would use its veto to prevent matters from going any 
further.30 The U.S. delegation in New York proposed a Security Council resolution under Article 
40, which enabled the Council to moderate a dispute by ‘call[ing] upon the parties concerned to 
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable’. The proposed 
resolution required the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all ‘offensive’ weapons in Cuba, 
under UN supervision. The initiative was purely symbolic, with Chayes noting that it ‘stood no 
chance of being adopted and was not introduced with an expectation that it would be’.31 
There was the possibility of General Assembly authorisation of the blockade using the 
‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure, which the United States and Canada had sponsored in 1950 to 
circumvent the paralysis of the Security Council.32 This resulted in UN condemnation of the 
People’s Republic of China as the aggressor in Korea, but the increase in Assembly members in 
subsequent years through decolonisation did not bring a corresponding boost in support for the 
United States. The result was that, as a British analysis noted, U.S. officials doubted their ability 
during the missile crisis ‘to muster a sufficiently impressive majority’ in the General Assembly.33 
Therefore the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure remained dormant. Beyond the Council and the 
Assembly, Acting Secretary General U Thant strove to mediate. He proposed a suspension of the 
U.S. blockade and of Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, during which the superpowers would 
negotiate. By 28 October Washington and Moscow had reached an agreement between 
themselves featuring an American pledge not to invade Cuba and an unofficial commitment to 
remove the Jupiter missiles in Turkey within six months, in return for the removal of the missiles 
from Cuba. The subsequent negotiations in New York to work out the details of the arrangement 
took place under U Thant’s good offices. The Acting Secretary General visited Cuba to try to 
                                                 
29 Ganser, Reckless Gamble, pp.92-94. 
30 Meeker to Rusk, 18 October 1962, 611.3722/10-162, RG 59, NARA II. 
31 Chayes, Cuban Missile Crisis, p.83. For the text of the resolution, see ‘Draft resolution submitted by 
the United States to the Security Council’, 23 October 1962, in Henry M. Pachter, Collision Course: The 
Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp.207-08. 
32 Although the Western campaign during the Korean War of 1950-53 was carried out under the UN 
banner, this was only possible because when the war broke out the Soviet Union was boycotting the 
Security Council and so could not employ its veto. This enabled the American government to use the UN 
for its own purpose.  
33 New York to FO, 22 October 1962, PREM 11/3689, TNA. 
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establish a UN inspection regime to confirm the removal of the missiles, although Castro’s 
concerns about national sovereignty made the effort abortive.34 
 The difficulties in the UN obliged the U.S. government to look to the OAS to authorise 
the blockade of Cuba. On 23 October, Dean Rusk persuaded the OAS’s Organ of Consultation to 
provide post facto support.35 The use of a regional organisation putatively in service of the UN 
was a first, but because of the ambiguous legal position it was something that Richard N. 
Gardner feared would ‘erode’ the American position.36 Certainly, as will be seen, some other 
governments did question the use of the OAS instead of the UN. 
 The vigorous response to the discovery of Soviet nuclear missile bases in Cuba was 
consistent with the Monroe Doctrine, a warning from President James Monroe in 1823 to deter 
European states against encroaching into the Americas. Eighty years later, the Theodore 
Roosevelt ‘Corollary’ used the Doctrine to legitimise U.S. military intervention in Latin 
America. By the 1930s, following debate among U.S. and Latin American international lawyers, 
politicians and intellectuals, the Monroe Doctrine had been reframed as what one historian has 
described as ‘a continental and multilateral principle of non-intervention’.37 This process of 
evolution meant that, as Dean Rusk told the Senate in September 1962, the Doctrine had changed 
‘both by circumstances and by agreement’, although it remained ‘an elementary part of our 
whole national security interests’.38 The State Department suggested that in establishing the 
blockade, the United States had ‘acted unilaterally in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine as well as 
multilaterally with its friends in the hemisphere to counter’ the Soviet ‘threat in a manner 
                                                 
34 See A. Walter Dorn and Robert Pauk, ‘Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, 
Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 2 (April 2009), pp. 261-92. Ganser, Reckless Gamble, notes (p.101) U 
Thant’s statement to Castro that ‘My colleagues and I are of the opinion that the blockade is illegal’.  
35 The OAS had expelled the Castro government at the Punta del Este Conference of January 1962. 
Wright, ‘Cuban Quarantine’, p.546; and Ganser, Reckless Gamble, pp.65-68. Article VI of the 1947 Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (commonly known as the Rio Treaty) provided that in the case 
of ‘an aggression that is not an armed attack’, the OAS’s ‘Organ of Consultation shall meet, and may, by 
a two-thirds vote, take measures which ... may include the use of armed force’. Shalom (‘International 
Lawyers’, p.87), however, has doubted whether the Soviet emplacement of nuclear missiles in Cuba was 
a genuine example of ‘aggression’. There is evidence that the U.S. government would have blockaded 
Cuba irrespective of OAS endorsement, with President Kennedy telling Congressional leaders on 22 
October that if the OAS refused to extend its backing ‘we are going to have to have what’s legally an 
legally an illegal’ blockade (he, did, however, suggest that a declaration of war might be considered in the 
absence of OAS support). Zelikow and May, eds., John F. Kennedy III, p.80. Note that, as Barton 
Bernstein has suggested, that the favourable OAS verdict was achieved with some ‘deft coercion’ 
involving the U.S. provision of economic aid. Barton Bernstein, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the 
Jupiters in Turkey?’, Political Science Quarterly, Vo. 95, No. 1 (Spring 1980), p.116. For the regional 
Cuban Missile Crisis, see Renata Keller, ‘The Latin American Missile Crisis’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 
39, No. 2 (2015), pp.195-222. See Ibid., note 4, for references to the (very limited) literature.  
36 Gardner to Cleveland, ‘Fundamentals of United States Position in Cuba’, 27 October 1962, U.S. 
Mission to the UN, RG 84, NARA II.  
37 See Juan Pablo Scarfi, ‘In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe 
Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898-
1933’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2016), pp.189-218. See also Carl Schmitt, ‘The Changing 
Structure of International Law’, translated by Antonio Cerella and Andrea Salvatore, The Journal of 
Cultural Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2016), pp.310-328, for a powerful exploration of the creeping 
expansion of American claims over the Western Hemisphere by the Second World War.  
38 Wright, ‘Cuban Quarantine’, p.552.  
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consistent with international law and our treaty obligations’.39 However, American officials did 
not raise the Doctrine in the legal case because, in the words of one analysis, it ‘did not create a 
special legal regime for the Western Hemisphere in which the United States is entitled to depart 
from the ordinary rules’.40 Furthermore, the Doctrine had long-term associations with 
unilateralism and heavy-handedness, despite a partial repudiation of the Roosevelt corollary and 
the adoption of a more ‘neighbourly’ turn under Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s. Therefore, 
the U.S. argument was that the naval embargo or ‘quarantine’ fell short of a belligerent blockade, 
and that the OAS could properly be used as a regional agency of the UN even without Security 
Council authorisation. 
 
Self-Defense?  
 
The legal attempt to justify the blockade was silent about the right of self-defense, that is, the 
right to respond with force to an actual or imminent armed attack. Abram Chayes wrote later that 
presenting self-defense arguments would have suggested that the U.S. government took the view 
that ‘the situation was to be governed by national discretion not international law’.41 
Nonetheless, self-defense did feature in the general narrative of American policy, with Kennedy 
describing the Soviet missiles in his 22 October public address as ‘offensive weapons of sudden 
mass destruction’ that would generate a ‘full retaliatory response’ should any be launched.42 
American officials tended to think that Moscow’s chief objective behind establishing the bases in 
Cuba was strategic, to remedy the inferior status of the Soviet Union in the nuclear balance of 
power. National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, for example, speculated that Khrushchev’s 
‘generals have been telling him ... that he was missing a golden opportunity to add to his 
strategic capability’.43 Although no comparable Soviet assessments are available, an American 
analysis suggested that the missiles in Cuba were of great strategic significance because they 
‘increase the first-strike missile salvo which the USSR could place on targets in the continental 
United States by over 40%’.44 
Yet it did not follow that the Soviet Union intended to launch the missiles; for a start, the 
country was still in a position of inferiority, and, more broadly, as L. W. Fuller of the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Staff noted, nuclear weapons meant ‘deterrence, for actual use 
means mutual destruction’.45 After the resolution of the missile crisis and the provision of a non-
                                                 
39 ‘The Monroe Doctrine and Cuba’, n.d., Office of Assistant Legal Adviser for Interamerican Affairs, RG 
59, NARA II.  
40 Meeker to Rusk, 18 October 1962, 611.3722/10-162, RG 59, NARA II. See also Rostow to Bundy, 31 
August 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963  X Cuba, January 1961–September 
1962, document 400.  
41 See Brownlie, International Law, pp.250-79, for the right of self-defense after the Second World War; 
and Chayes, Cuban Missile Crisis, pp.65-66. 
42 Report to the American People, 22 October 1962, Public Papers 1962, p. 808.  
43 Zelikow and May, eds., John F. Kennedy III, p.451. 
44 Garthoff to ExComm, 27 October 1962, in Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (Washington: Brookings, 1987), p.138; and ‘Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba’, 21 October 1962, 
Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington: CIA History Staff, 
1992), pp.247-59.  
45 Fuller to Rostow, 29 October 1962, 611.3722/10-2962, RG 59. The doctrine of Mutual Assured 
Destruction (MAD) would become prominent in the wake of the missile crisis. 
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invasion pledge from the US government, Soviet representatives maintained that it was now 
reasonable to remove the missiles from Cuba because the Cuban revolution was now safe.46 
Western officials tended to see this argument as a post facto rationalization of the climb-down 
under pressure, but the emergence of new evidence since the end of the Cold War has brought 
greater acceptance of the defending-Cuba argument. After reviewing Soviet sources, historian 
Sergey Radchenko concluded recently that ‘it is no longer safe to claim that Khrushchev was 
motivated strictly by strategic considerations’.47 Securing an ally in the Western Hemisphere was 
a tremendous political advance for Moscow, and was to be guarded carefully. 
Despite taking the legal initiative, U.S. officials never gainsaid Cuba’s right to accept the 
missiles. There was simply no basis for making that argument – Cuba had consented to the 
placement of the missiles, and as jurist Quincy Wright noted, a sovereign state is legally free to 
take, within its own territory and in the absence of treaty obligations to the contrary, measures 
which it considers necessary for its defense.48 The Soviets raised the issue of Cuban sovereignty 
successfully in the UN Security Council on 24 October. Vladimir Zorin, according to the British 
representative in the UN, Patrick Dean, ‘contrived to bring home effectively’ the point that 
‘every country has a right to choose what weapons of defense should be stationed on its own 
sovereign soil’.49 This argument was a compelling one, as some American officials 
acknowledged. Richard F. Pederson of the U.S. mission to the UN admitted that ‘from the point 
of view of international law missiles in Cuba and in Turkey were equally legal’, while L. W. 
Fuller conceded that ‘the argument that Soviet missiles in Cuba are offensive while ours in 
Turkey are defensive is a plain, subjective rationalisation’.50 
The American government had in recent years established nuclear missile bases in 
Britain, Italy and Turkey. It was maintained, though, that these were a different proposition to 
the bases in Cuba because Soviet actions were covert and completely unwarranted, while the 
United States had acted openly in response to the adversary’s ‘expansion and aggression’.51 Yet 
                                                 
46 János Kádár’s account of his visit to Moscow, 12 November 1962, Cold War International History 
Project Bulletin, Issue 17/18 (Fall 2012), p.437.  
47 Sergey Radchenko, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis: Assessment of New, and Old, Russian Sources’, 
International Relations, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2012), p.330. See James G. Hershberg, ‘Before the “Missiles of 
October”: Did Kennedy plan a Military Strike against Cuba?’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 
1990), pp. 163-98, on the likelihood of a further American attack on Cuba. 
48 Wright, ‘Cuban Quarantine’, p.550. As for Castro’s motives for accepting the missiles, he stated later 
that they would ‘strengthen the entire socialist camp’ while contributing to Cuba’s defense. James G. 
Blight, Bruce J. Allyn and David A. Welch, eds., with foreword by Jorge I. Dominguez, Cuba on the 
Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon, 1993), p.198. 
49 New York to Foreign Office (FO), 24 October 1962, FO 371/162376.  For Adlai Stevenson’s 
successful riposte to Zorin the following day, see Ganser, Reckless Gamble, pp.113-18. 
50 Richard F. Pedersen, ‘Cuba’, 4 December 1962, U.S. Mission to the UN, RG 84; and Fuller to Rostow, 
29 October 1962, 611.3722/10-2962, RG 59, NARA II. 
51 On the missiles in Britain, see Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, ‘The Other Other Missiles of October: 
The Thor IBMs and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, Electronic Journal of International History, 3, 30 January 
2012, <http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/3387/> On the missiles in Turkey, see Philip Nash, The Other Missiles 
of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957–1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1997). Telegram to all diplomatic and consular posts, 24 October 1962, FRUS 1961-1963 
X/XI/XII, document 390. John Lewis Gaddis points out that ‘the Turkish deployment, while no secret, was 
not widely publicized’. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford UK: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), p.268.   
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by stationing nuclear missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev and Castro were responding at least in part to 
American aggression, and it was the case that the secrecy of the Soviet operation had no bearing 
on its legality.52 For the Kennedy administration, though, secrecy did make the issue more 
inflammatory, given that in September the President had warned Moscow that grave issues 
would arise if Cuba was turned into a nuclear missile base. Political concerns were also very 
much evident in his 22 October public address, which condemned ‘the secret, swift, and 
extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles in an area well known to have a special and 
historical relationship to the United States … in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of 
American and hemispheric policy’.53 The following day he referred to the Soviet missiles as a 
‘horror’ that would ‘embarrass me in the [November Congressional] election’.54 Historian Peter 
Ling has suggested fairly that Kennedy would have been ‘damaged politically’ if he did not 
challenge the deployment in Cuba successfully. Allies in Europe would ‘fret about irresolute 
American leadership… Third World countries would perceive the USSR as a more assiduous 
protector of its allies, and Khrushchev himself would be emboldened to act forcefully elsewhere’ 
– perhaps Berlin. Additionally, there would be the boost to the President’s ‘domestic Republican 
opponents’.55 
Historian William J. Medland has noted that designating the Soviet missiles in Cuba as 
offensive enabled the U.S. government to present an international political matter as a security 
threat.56 To be sure, the response to the discovery of the missiles in Cuba could have reflected, 
without contradiction, worries about politics and prestige on one hand and about physical 
security on the other, but politics and prestige are not pertinent to the law of self-defense. 
Furthermore, any attempt to convey the impression that the Soviets were poised to launch a 
nuclear first strike from Cuba was mere hyperbole, which means that the invocation of self-
defense in U.S. rhetoric must be taken with a substantial pinch of salt. 
 
Allied Responses to the Legal Case 
 
                                                 
52 On the failure to anticipate the Soviet establishment of missile bases in Cuba, see David M. Barrett and 
Max Holland, Blind Over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis (College Station: Texas A & M, 
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54 Zelikow and May, eds., John F. Kennedy III, p.178. On how far domestic politics influenced the 
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No. 1 (1986), pp.87-119. 
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56 William J. Medland, The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Needless or Necessary?  (New York: Praeger, 
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Withana has argued that ‘Soviet representatives were unable through their legal rhetoric to 
establish the “legality” of their position or the illegality of the U.S. position’,57 but those foreign 
officials outside the Soviet bloc who expressed a view tended to doubt only the American legal 
position. This was evident in the attitudes of the United States’ ‘special’ ally, Britain.58 Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan’s initial reaction to news of the Soviet missiles was to favour 
military action, with him writing in his diary that the President ought ‘to seize Cuba and have 
done with it’. Historian Peter Catterall maintains that this view derived from doubts about the 
blockade’s ability to facilitate the removal of the nuclear missiles, and about its legality.59 But 
after Washington had decided to blockade Cuba rather than attack the bases, Macmillan asked 
President Kennedy for ‘the best legal case’ so that Patrick Dean could ‘weigh in effectively’ on 
behalf of the U.S. government at the UN. It was necessary, as Macmillan pointed out, to address 
the point ‘that a blockade which involves the searching of ships of all countries is difficult to 
defend in peacetime’.60 Duly, Kennedy instructed his ‘experts’ to ‘confer’ with British ones ‘to 
provide the best possible legal case’.61 
The legal status of the blockade mattered to London, because there were limits to British 
sympathy with American policy. Labour Party leader Harold Wilson argued on television that 
the United States should have taken the case to the United Nations before imposing a 
blockade.62A National Opinion Poll in The Daily Mail on 25 October indicated that there was 
36% opposition to the blockade, and that 63% of those surveyed thought that the U.S. action 
threatened world peace.63 Letters to Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home, who gave a 
televised, pro-American speech to the International Chamber of Commerce in London on 23 
October, are also revealing. Alongside urging British mediation, many of the correspondents 
raised legal objections to American policies. It was maintained, for example, that the government 
should ‘state unambiguously that Britain will refuse to have her legal maritime rights abused’ by 
having to comply with the blockade; Kennedy should ‘cancel his illegal blockade of a sovereign 
state in time of peace’; and the blockade was an example of ‘piracy on the High Seas ... 
                                                 
57 Withana, Power, Politics, Law, p.197. 
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interfering with British ships going about lawful trade’.64 Some of the criticism came from those 
who no doubt were always hostile to American actions, and in most cases the reflections 
appeared to derive from instinct rather than expertise. However, the hazy legal status of the 
blockade provided the amateur lawyers with ammunition. 
 It should be acknowledged that there was some sympathy in Whitehall with the American 
legal case. Leader of the House of Lords, Lord Hailsham (a lawyer) noted that in an age when 
nuclear weapons were ‘ready to go off at a moment’s notice’, there were questions about the 
relevance of classical law reflecting the technology of the ‘sailing ship and the cannon’ and a 
clear distinction between war and peace.65 Nonetheless, Lord Chancellor Dilhorne summarised 
the consensus of government lawyers as holding that ‘the “quarantine” could not be justified as 
“pacific blockade”’, given that it extended to third party vessels without a declaration of war. 
Although it might be contended that the Soviet nuclear missile bases in Cuba posed ‘a threat to 
the United States of such imminence as to necessitate ... immediate steps to render that threat 
nugatory’, this was questionable because the American action ‘appears to be designed to prevent 
the threat becoming imminent’.66 The British Mission to the UN concluded that Washington 
relied excessively on the regional agency argument, and that there was no adequate legal 
justification ‘for the interception under the “quarantine” measures of ships of third states on the 
high seas’.67 British officials in New York and Washington encouraged their American 
counterparts to use ‘language indicating more precisely the nature of the measures which they 
are imposing’ rather than the ‘undefined term’ “quarantine”’. It was feared that the term could 
generate ‘criticism and ridicule’.68 Yet American officials felt that they had selected the best 
description of the naval embargo, so felt no reason to change. 
For his part, Alec Douglas-Home thought that Cuba had been ‘entitled to call for military 
aid from another government if necessary for the purpose of its defense’, just as NATO countries 
had consented to American nuclear missile bases on their territory. He also considered that 
‘while it might be possible for the U.S. administration to justify action against Cuban ships and 
possibly Soviet ships’, it was ‘in the absence of United Nations authority ... very difficult to 
justify action’ against the ships of other countries.69 Freedom of the seas was a sensitive issue for 
a country with a proud naval heritage. Royal Navy frigates in the West Indies made a point of 
avoiding the blockade to allow the U.S. navy to focus on Soviet vessels,70 but the fact that 
Britain had (over American objections) maintained trade links with Cuba meant that British 
civilian ships could be affected.71 There were British vessels in the Caribbean not destined for 
Cuba, and others that having loaded in communist ports were bound for the island.72 Douglas-
Home noted that if Washington extended the blockade to include POL (petroleum, oil, 
lubricants) and other commodities, British shippers might have to ‘abandon the Cuba run 
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altogether and take whatever action was open to them to secure legal redress’.73 Macmillan 
recognised that extending the blockade would mean ‘trouble’,74 because the British government 
would then face the awkward proposition of having to back the rights of its citizens against 
Washington.  
The U.S. Navy was instructed to make only spot checks on friendly shipping, and 
ultimately no British vessels were detained.75 However, the fact that the London government 
reserved its legal rights in relation to shipping showed that, as historian Christopher Hull has 
argued, it could take a legalistic stance when national interests were under threat. More vital, 
though, was the need to support the United States.76 Therefore, according to historian L.V. Scott, 
Harold Macmillan ‘subordinated international law to the exigencies of the [missile] crisis’.77 The 
Prime Minister’s pragmatism was evident in how he attempted to silence the legal critics. When 
in the House of Commons on 25 October an MP stated that there was ‘talk ... about acts of 
piracy’, he responded that this was not ‘the moment to go into the niceties of international law ... 
in new ... unprecedented situations in the nuclear world we cannot rely on a pedantic review of 
precedents’.78 In an effort to maintain the fullest international support for the United States, 
Macmillan told Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, who questioned the legality of the 
blockade and rued a lack of meaningful consultation from Washington, that legal criticisms were 
‘sterile and irrelevant’. The priority was to ‘prevent consolidation of the offensive potential for 
the Soviet Union in Cuba’.79 Promptings such as these may have had some effect. The Canadian 
Department of External Affairs (DEA) noted the ‘sui generis’ nature of the quarantine, while the 
Chief of the Naval Staff concluded that because the lawfulness of the action was ill-defined, 
Canada could accept it without condoning an illegal act. Nonetheless, as Undersecretary of 
External Affairs Norman Robertson advised his colleagues, it was wise to avoid public 
discussion of the quarantine’s legality, given the ambiguity of the issue.80 
There were also concerns in Australia’s Department of External Affairs (DEA). An 
analysis for Secretary to the DEA Arthur Tange maintained that pacific blockades were serious, 
but justified, measures when enacted under the UN Charter to prevent the outbreak of war; 
outside the parameters of the UN, many jurists considered it illegal. William D. Forsyth of the 
DEA’s UN Branch concluded that ‘no clear positive legal basis appears’. Another assessment 
noted that Canberra had ‘a distinct interest in preserving the right of powerful allies to put bases 
and offensive weapons in Australia if we want them’. Tange and Minister of External Affairs 
Garfield Barwick acknowledged the inconsistency of this position given the placement of Soviet 
strategic weapons in Cuba. Thus, the Australian government ‘should consider carefully the 
concept that the presence of such bases and weapons on Cuban soil represents an act of Soviet 
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aggression’. If the Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba was an act of aggression, the installation of 
American weapons on Australian territory might invite a response from the Soviets 
commensurate with the U.S. action: Australia could be ‘vulnerable to a Soviet blockade (in the 
name of a “quarantine”) of any American offensive weapons which may be located on Australian 
soil at some future time and targeted on the Soviet Union’. This reasoning implied that the Soviet 
bases in Cuba and the American base in Turkey were analogous. Ultimately, though, Australia’s 
interest in American defense backing prevailed, with historians Laura Stanley and Philip Deery 
arguing that Canberra ‘pledged its support, albeit limited, to the American UN resolution, in 
order to obtain a maximum gain: the maintenance of its most important alliance in furtherance of 
its geostrategic interests’.81 
To be sure, some allied representatives – such as President Charles de Gaulle of France 
and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany – endorsed American 
policy without displaying any interest in the legal dimension.82 All the same, the U.S. 
government’s construction of a case in law recognised the fact that the legal propriety of the 
blockade was very much open to question. Few of the foreign officials or politicians who 
expressed a view had confidence in the case, although acknowledgements that the existing legal 
framework was outdated were consistent with the arguments of Washington.  
 
Promoting The Legal Case after the Crisis 
 
After Moscow’s agreement to remove IL-28 nuclear capable bombers as well as the nuclear 
missiles from Cuba, Washington ended the blockade on 20 November. Abram Chayes wanted to 
neutralise legal criticisms of the blockade, including arguments from French sociologist 
Raymond Aron that power politics had prevailed over law, by outlining the legal case in the 
journal Foreign Affairs.83 However, he faced opposition from Harlan Cleveland of the 
International Organizations Office of the State Department, who feared unnecessary controversy, 
and who was concerned that the legal rationale for relying on regional agencies needed a great 
deal of refinement if it was ever to work ‘as good international organization doctrine’. Cleveland 
argued that the UN Charter should not be interpreted as ‘licensing any use of force by a regional 
group’, and the doctrine that ‘regional security actions are valid unless specifically rejected by 
the UN’ gave ‘too much license to regional arrangements’. There was the danger of playing into 
the hands of the Soviet Union, which would seize on any legal justification framed by the U.S. 
government that could be used for orchestrating the Warsaw Pact against an Iron Curtain state 
‘striving for freedom’.84 Nonetheless, Dean Rusk and George Ball backed Chayes, who argued in 
Foreign Affairs that relying on the OAS as a regional agency did not undermine the status of the 
UN ‘as the paramount organization’, and that the UN had, ‘through the Council and the 
Secretary-General’ become ‘actively involved in the effort to develop a permanent solution to 
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the threat to the peace represented by the Soviet nuclear capability in Cuba’.85 Meeker weighed 
in, too, with an article in The American Journal of International Law, extending the effort to set 
a legal precedent by arguing that ‘no settled law was ready at hand to deal with the action created 
by the clandestine Soviet introduction of strategic missiles into Cuba in 1962’.86 For Meeker, 
international law needed to catch up with the use of the quarantine, which was a measured and 
reasonable response to a real threat. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The U.S. government’s promotion of the legal case for blockade of Cuba during the missile crisis 
represented part of a broader effort to win support, including the President’s TV and radio 
broadcast of 22 October, and briefings to leaders of NATO states and to 95 foreign 
ambassadors.87 Although there was little genuine consultation with allies about how to respond 
to the discovery of the Soviet missiles,88 allied backing was vital to the moral standing of 
American policy. Withana has maintained that the American government’s ‘skilful use of the 
ideology of international law’ was ‘an important factor’ behind the U.S. victory, while ‘relatively 
weaker references to the ideology of international law by Soviet representatives was a factor in 
shaping the outcome of Soviet acquiescence to U.S. priorities to remove Soviet missiles from 
Cuba’.89 Yet there is a consensus that Khrushchev relented because the Soviet Union was in a 
position of military weakness in the Caribbean and because he recognised the danger of 
catastrophic escalation.90 As has been seen, the Soviet Union occupied the legal high ground 
during the missile crisis, but was forced to retreat. The reservations of U.S. allies about the legal 
status of the blockade suggest that Moscow was more adept at making a case than might be 
recognised.  
Some Washington officials were sincerely confident that the blockade was legally sound, 
with Leonard Meeker telling US representative to the UN Adlai Stevenson that with the 
‘quarantine’ the United States had ‘made some unexpected new law’ suited to contemporary 
conditions.91 Yet others, such as Richard N. Gardner, had their doubts about the legal position, as 
has been noted. The missile crisis demonstrated the scope for inconsistency among government 
legal specialists, given how on occasions they may be required to provide an objective judgment 
in law of a particular policy, and then, regardless of the merits of the case, be obliged to advocate 
publicly the same or a similar policy.92 This was evident in Abram Chayes’ initial reservations 
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about the lawfulness of a naval blockade of Cuba, and then, after the discovery of the Soviet 
missile bases, his legal evangelisation on behalf of the blockade irrespective of any doubts – 
concerning, perhaps, the validity of using the OAS without UN endorsement. There is a tension 
in vesting both the judge and advocate functions in the same officials. 
Soon after the missile crisis, many jurists in the United States published articles in 
scholarly journals in which they endorsed the legality of the blockade.93 In 1990, as the first Gulf 
War approached, Richard N. Gardner – now a professor of international law at Columbia 
University – argued that ‘since the Cuban missile crisis, the law has been in evolution, so 
stopping ships may no longer be an act of war’. He was therefore a little more optimistic than he 
had been in 1962, but there was still a need to tread warily, with Secretary of State James Baker 
III telling an interviewer in connection with action against Iraq that ‘the Administration is 
avoiding the words “blockade” and “quarantine” because under international law those terms can 
be interpreted as acts of war’. The word ‘interdiction’ was used instead.94 Since then, jurists have 
been ambivalent about the legal merit of the blockade against Cuba in 1962, with some arguing 
that it represented a ‘peaceful blockade’, and others maintaining that in the absence of an armed 
attack it contravened the UN Charter.95 The ‘ultimate judgment of history’ has not been as 
favourable as Chayes and his colleagues had hoped. 
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